The reflection on Lucky Company comes from the reflection of investment predecessors, and the following excerpts are from this investment predecessor:
- Review the logic mentioned repeatedly last year: invest in lucky companies.
- Truly excellent companies, those that can create their own era, are very few (such as Apple, Tesla, Nvidia, etc.). The vast majority of companies follow the ups and downs of the times. Therefore, when we invest, except for a few times, most of the time we invest in companies that follow the times, in other words, "lucky" companies.
- Muyuan is a good company, but it also loses money when it is unlucky. On the contrary, when industry cycles overlap with industry events, Muyuan is a lucky enough company.
- We should focus on how lucky this company is and how well it adapts to the times.
- On the other hand, we should also look up and see what the era is like and who might be the lucky companies in this era.
- At the same time, for those lucky enough companies, we should not be infatuated for the long term. Luck can also come to an end easily. When everything looks good, always keep a cautious mindset and be ready to retreat.
- When everyone praises, it may be the peak of luck. When someone praises, there will be others who come to learn, and the luckiest time may have passed.
- If the company's boss also comes out at this time to boast about how they did it, we should be more cautious. If the leader has already become arrogant, we should resolutely sell.
- When we feel that the company is no longer so lucky, we should sell. This psychological barrier is smaller.
- For a company, as long as there is a major strategic adjustment, no matter how well it is packaged, a part of it should be sold first. Behind the strategic adjustment, luck is often close to an end and new challenges are about to come. We should observe first and then make judgments.
Luck is indeed a very good starting point for thinking, which coincides with my perspective on "power structure" that I have been thinking about. From the perspective of power structure: in some ecosystems, the power structure is stable, and the core value of the ecosystem is firmly controlled by the most powerful targets. The source of this power comes from the enterprise/project's ability to achieve "only I can do it, others can't" through time windows, brand advantages, technological advantages, and other means. Typical examples include the US dollar, Hermès, and Apple. The core risk here is that once the brand, technology, and other advantages of the power source disappear, the stable state of the original power structure will gradually change. The advantage is that this kind of power structure has stronger continuity, and even if changes occur, it will give investors time to collect, understand, and react to information.
Another type of ecosystem has an unstable power structure, and the core value holder of the ecosystem may undergo significant shifts in a short period of time. This phenomenon occurs because the target cannot achieve "only I can do it, others can't" in the ecosystem for a long time. The reason why power gathers on the target is mainly due to changes in the internal and external environment of the ecosystem, similar to the concept of "luck" mentioned here. For example, cyclical stocks or commodities, the bargaining power may be in the hands of the seller for two or three years, but as the supply expands, the bargaining power shifts to the buyer.
The target exists in multiple ecosystems at the same time, and these ecosystems also have competition and inclusion relationships. For example, in the stable power structure of the film camera ecosystem, Kodak is the core power holder. But in the "photography mega-ecosystem" that emerged later with the advent of digital cameras, film cameras and digital cameras compete with each other, and the power structure is very unstable. Therefore, we cannot ignore the changes in the power structure in various ecosystems where the target is located.